An overview of takeover defenses and the characteristics of the economy by Tachmatzidi, Isidora
 
International Journal of Finance, Insurance and Risk Management 
Volume X, Issue 4, 2020 
pp. 40-49 
 
An Overview of Takeover Defenses and the Characteristics  
of the Economy       
 Submitted 08/10/20, 1st revision 09/11/20, 2nd revision 29/11/20, accepted 17/12/20    
 




Purpose: The present paper offers an overview of takeover defenses and an analysis of the way 
in which economic structures and characteristics may influence the presence of takeovers and 
takeover defenses. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: A brief definition of takeovers and takeover defenses is 
presented, followed by a thorough analysis of the different types of takeover defenses, 
frustrating and defensive actions. Then, there is an analysis of the economic structures and 
characteristics that may influence the employment of takeovers and defenses as well as their 
in-between interaction. 
Findings: In economies which have dispersed ownership structures, contestability and higher 
investment strategies more hostile takeovers tend to occur and consequently, takeover 
defenses, whereas economies in which ownership is more concentrated takeovers are not 
employed frequently. 
Practical Implications: The present article aims to offer a clarification on the interaction 
between takeover defenses and characteristics of the economy. Also, the analysis indicates the 
importance of the regulatory framework regarding these issues, taking into consideration the 
differences in the structure of the economies. 
Originality/Value: It provides the framework to develop potential regulation and policies 
regarding takeovers and takeover defenses in order to promote EU harmonization and global 
cooperation. 
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According to European Union law, “a ‘takeover bid’ …shall mean a public offer... 
made to the holders of the securities of a company to acquire all or some of those 
securities, whether mandatory or voluntary, which follows or has as its objective the 
acquisition of control of the offeree company in accordance with national law” 
(Takeover Directive, 2004). 
 
Takeovers could be classified in two categories; friendly and hostile (Gorzala, 2010). 
The former involve takeovers that are performed with the approval of the target board 
of directors, as opposed to the latter where no such approval is obtained. As a result, 
hostile takeovers usually produce takeover defenses in order to hinder or obstruct 
completely the imminent takeover (Kraakman, 2009). Such takeover defenses could 
be further categorized in defensive and frustrating actions, depending on factors such 
as whether the target board is  allowed to employ them or whether they affect the 
decision-making process of the shareholders (Ogowewo, 1997). 
 
However, it is crucial to examine how the different economic characteristics and 
structures may influence the presence of takeovers and takeover defenses. Stronger 
economies with secure market environments that promote investments have more 
takeovers, in contrast to weaker economies where the macroeconomic indicators tend 
to hinder market development. Furthermore, there are certain factors, such as 
privatisations, which may lead to the increase of takeovers thus, promote the creation 
of an open market for corporate control.  
 
2. Takeover Defenses: Frustrating and Defensive Actions 
 
An initial categorization of hostile takeovers could be made on the basis of the target’s 
board of directors’ actions. Cases in which the target board decides to employ defenses 
in order to frustrate a takeover bid are considered as operating on the “non-neutrality 
rule”, whereas when the target board does not perform any obstructive action without 
having the prior consent of the shareholders of the target company are cases 
considered as advocating the “board neutrality rule” (Article 9, Takeover Directive 
2004). 
 
Taking into consideration the above distinction, a division in relation to post-bid 
takeover defenses could be made in defensive and frustrating actions (Kraakman et 
al., 2009). Defensive actions are defenses that are used by the board of directors in 
order to provide influence over the shareholders on a takeover bid that is imminent or 
that has already been made (Takeovers Panel, 2013). It is important to mention that 
these acts are permitted by law and they do not materially corrupt the decision-making 
process of the shareholders.  
 
On the other hand, frustrating actions result to the takeover obstruction and to the 
above material corruption or deprivation of target shareholders rights. Although in 
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general such acts are not permitted due to the ‘no frustration’ rule (Article 9 of 
Takeover Directive), the board of directors is permitted to employ them in cases where 
the target shareholders have given their approval for their use. 
 
3. Frustrating Actions 
 
3.1 Restructuring Defenses and Target Repurchases Framework  
 
“Restructuring Defenses” are corporate restructuring actions used in order to frustrate 
a takeover bid. It is required to obtain prior shareholder approval and they result in an 
alteration of the securities of the company. Therefore, they are also referred as 
‘changes to the assets of the company’. Some defenses that fall within this category 
could be considered Crown Jewels Defense, Greenmail, Privatisation, Defensive 
Acquisition and Liquidation. (Johansson and Thortensson, 2008). They are briefly 
analysed below. 
 
The “Crown Jewels Defense” is an action that involves the target company selling its 
important divisions and assets to a white knight or a third party in order to put the 
company in a position where the bidder is no longer attracted to make a takeover bid 
(Zarin and Yang, 2011). It may then purchase back from the friendly company its 
shares according to a price that has been agreed beforehand through sale and lease-
back agreements or otherwise (Johansson and Thortensson, 2008). 
 
Furthermore, “Greenmail” or target repurchase defense involves the bidder company 
selling the target company’s shares to the latter at a higher existing premium (Shah, 
1996) and prohibiting the bidder from purchasing again for an agreed time period 
(Zarin and Yang, 2011). 
 
Another corporate restructuring defense is “Privatisation” with which a public 
company is being conversed into a private one (Tachmatzidi, 2017). As a result, the 
company is no longer being traded on the stock market (Johansson and Thortensson, 
2008), the board of directors retaining their existing positions and the shareholders 
making a profit from the received premium. Also, directors are able to retain their 
positions and the shareholders make a profit from the premium received. 
 
“Defensive Acquisition” and “Liquidation” are two defenses which involve reductions 
in borrowing and termination of company trading, respectively (Johansson and 
Thortensson, 2008). It should be mentioned that liquidation is used as a defense only 
in cases where the premium paid by the takeover bidder is lower that the liquidation 
premium. 
 
3.2 Litigation Framework 
 
The board of directors of the target company might, in cases where there is prior 
shareholder approval, employ tactical litigation, or otherwise obstructive, in order to 
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frustrate or obstruct a takeover offer (Underhill and Austmann, 2002). This type of 
defense could be used before, during or after the relevant takeover bid contest 
(Ogowewo, 2007) and may include different type of actions. For instance, legal 
injunctions, restraining orders and antitrust litigations could be used by the target 
company (Zarin and Yang, 2011). These actions may consequently, lead in disclosure 
of the strategic plan and negotiations performed between the bidder and the target 
company with the latter receiving a higher profit from the takeover offer and as a 
counter-offer terminating the litigation proceedings. 
 
Tactical litigation has some disadvantages, mainly in relation to delays in court, 
compliance procedures as well as costs associated with such delays, and therefore, 
possible inefficacy on what concerns long-term investments (Zarin and Yang, 2011). 
However, due to the fact that tactical litigation defense results in maximization of 
shareholder profit and increase of takeover bid prices, is considered as a highly 
successful defense (Ogowewo, 2007). 
 
4. Defensive Actions 
 
Defensive actions include several frameworks, such as Defense Document 
Framework, Lobbying, Seeking Alternative Bids and Profit Forecasts. An explanation 
of these defenses follows. 
 
A defensive action that could be taken by the board of directors is the issuance of a 
circular, which is defined as a “Defense Document”, and includes the board’s opinion 
on the takeover bid as well as the positive and negative consequences the takeover 
could result in, taking also into account the hostile bidder’s strategic plan. It is issued 
equally to all shareholders, pension scheme trustees, employees’ representatives and 
individuals with information rights (Stokka, 2013). Such action is used, for example, 
in the UK (Rule 25.1(a) of the UK Takeover Code). 
 
A defense strategy which does not require prior shareholder approval is the board of 
directors “Lobbying” for an appeal through the notification of competition authorities 
(Shearman and Sterling LLP, 2015/16) for the possibility of unfair competition 
(Kraakman, 2009). The board of directors could also, use the “Seeking alternative bids 
framework”; the White Knight or the White Squire defenses. These actions involve 
the target board of directors seeking alternative friendly takeover bidders without 
requiring prior shareholder approval (Stokka, 2013).  
 
In particular, with the White Knight defense, the friendly bidder makes a counter bid 
to the original hostile bidder with the purpose to out-bid it and prevent the unwanted 
hostile takeover (Johansson and Thortnsson, 2008), therefore acquiring the whole 
target company. It is important to notice that the above defense is considered to be 
highly effective for the target company to obstruct a hostile takeover (Tachmatzidi, 
2018). 
 
    An Overview of Takeover Defenses and the Characteristics  
of the Economy 
 44  
 
 
However, there are several risks associated with the White Knight defense, mainly 
with the difficulty of collaborating with a friendly bidder that is in fact trustworthy 
(Zarin and Yang, 2011). For instance, there is the danger of the hostile bidder 
purchasing the target company’s shares after the friendly bidder has acquired it (‘Lady 
Macbeth strategy’). 
 
The White Squire on the other hand, involves the acquisition from the target company 
of a substantial block of shares by the friendly bidder. Consequently, the latter is 
considered as having a significant position of power within the target company that 
could, also, lead to the obstruction of the hostile bid through voting procedures. 
 
Additionally, the target board of directors could influence its shareholders with the 
issuance of “Profit Forecasts”, which include accountants’ reports that the forecast has 
been issued responsibly and according to the official guidelines and processes (for 
instance, UK Takeover Code, Rule 28.1(a)(i)(ii). This defense usually results in 
influencing negatively the target company’s shareholders in relation to an imminent 
takeover bid (Tachmatzidi, 2018). However, it is stated that regulation for this type of 
takeover defense is imperative, due to the risks associated with misleading statements 
and their possible wrongful influence on the decision-making process (Ogowewo, 
2003). 
 
5. Advantages and Disadvantages of Takeover Defenses 
 
Both advantages and disadvantages could be found with the usage of takeover 
defenses during hostile takeovers (Tachmatzidi, 2017). To begin with, takeover 
defenses, especially in weak economies, could result in creating a market for corporate 
control which is more beneficial, efficient and open (Ruling, 2012). They, also, benefit 
the target companies in cases of misinformation or misleading valuations of their 
shares, as they are required to publish relevant information, resulting to the possible 
increase of their share value. 
 
According to the ‘bargaining power hypothesis’, takeover defenses could be used as 
negotiation mechanisms in order to increase the target’s company value and put 
pressure on the hostile bidder to raise the premium offer (Ruling, 2012). If they were 
used as such negotiating tools, they could lead to auctions, which would also in turn 
increase the takeover bid premiums as perspective hostile bidders would compete on 
the takeover offer. Another advantage of takeover defenses is their disciplinary 
function on what concerns the board of directors of the target company, as it creates 
the incentive to increase the company value and the target shareholders’ wealth. 
 
On the other hand, takeover defenses could also produce some negative consequences. 
The target board of directors might lose their incentive to direct the company in the 
most effective manner, as they will employ the relevant defenses and maintain their 
company position (Ruling, 2012). Additionally, the takeover offer by the hostile 
bidder after the employment of takeover defenses might be smaller and not as 
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profitable for the target shareholders, due to the fact that in some cases the bidder 
offers a higher from the market price premium in order to pressure the shareholders 
into agreeing with the offer. 
 
6. Presence of Takeovers in Relation to Economic Characteristics 
 
Differences that appear in countries’ economic structures have led to formulate the 
argument that there is interplay of influence between the presence of takeovers and 
their defenses with the different economic structures (Tachmatzidi, 2019). These 
differences may include ownership structures, contestability, lack of privatisations or 
investments, or even an economic crisis that may have affected each country and 
economy in a different manner. For this reason, even though one of the main aims of 
the European Union is the elimination of barriers in trade and free capital movement, 
it has been considered challenging to create a harmonised European framework on 
what concerns regulations of takeovers (Mukwiri, 2008). 
 
6.1 Ownership Structure: Dispersed vs. Concentrated 
 
The ownership structure of the market is another important factor influencing the 
presence of hostile takeovers and their respective defenses (Tachmatzidi, 2019). A 
dispersed ownership is defined as a structure where the market is mature in terms of 
equity liquidity. In such a market, takeovers and consequently, their defenses, are 
more frequently present, as companies have multiple investors and the board of 
directors try to safeguard their companies (Dinga, 2005).  
 
Notwithstanding, studies have argued that within a dispersed ownership structure, the 
board of directors might not serve towards shareholder wealth maximization but 
instead promote their own interests, due to the fact that this ownership structure is not 
considered as monitoring the board of directors closely (Dinga, 2005). Nonetheless, 
corporate governance can place mechanisms to face this problem (Goergen, 2005). 
 
On the other hand, a concentrated ownership is considered as a structure where the 
majority of the companies are state or family-owned. Most companies do not tend to 
have multiple investors; instead, shareholders have large blocks of shares that 
influence and control the company in a greater way than in a dispersed economic 
structure (Dinga, 2005). Due to the close relationship formed between the target 
shareholders and the target board of directors, the latter are impelled to govern the 
company efficiently or otherwise face the threat of a takeover bid (Kachaner, 2012).  
 
As a result, the incentives of the board of directors are high for effective management 
and due to the lack of different investors, takeovers and takeover defenses are not 
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Contestability is another important factor to examine when considering economies 
and the presence of hostile takeovers, as it creates an open market for corporate control 
(Ruling, 2012). Shareholder wealth maximization is one of the main priorities of the 
board of directors, although in some cases conflict may arise between shareholders 
and directors when the former consider a takeover offer more beneficial whereas the 
latter wanting to retain their board position. Furthermore, a contestable market has 
low barriers on what concerns entry and exit, finance equity is relied heavily upon and 
institutional investors have an important market seat. 
 
In a contestable market, takeovers may have a disciplinary effect, due to the fact that 
the board of directors try to perform high-quality and efficient management of the 
company in order for a takeover not to occur and for them to keep their current posts. 
Thus, the company itself, the board and its shareholders benefit from the ‘threat’ of a 
hostile takeover and as a result, company wealth and share prices may increase 
through such an effective allocation of resources and governance. 
 
On the contrary, a market which is not considered as contestable has a more 
concentrated ownership structure where, as mentioned above, most companies are 
state or family-owned (Tachmatzidi, 2019). In such a market, takeovers and their 
defenses occur less than in a contestable market. However, in cases where defenses 
are required to be used, the most competent and experienced to decide which defense 
to employ is the company’s board of directors. Therefore, even in a market with such 
characteristics, takeover defenses may act as a tool of discipline, as the target board 
aims to employ the defense that would have the best possible outcome for the 
company. 
 
6.3 Factors for the Development of a Market for Corporate Control 
 
There are factors, such as privitizations, investments and regulation, which may lead 
towards the development of a market for corporate control, especially regarding 
economies that are under crisis, and will consequently lead to an economy with more 
takeovers and respective defenses (Tachmatzidi, 2019). Firstly, one factor considered 
is the privatisation of the public sector, i.e. the privatisation of state-owned companies. 
This may create a more contestable market, where more emphasis is placed on equity 
liquidity, more investments take place and directors are hired and dislodged with 
greater frequency thus, creating a more competitive market. 
 
Another crucial factor that contributes to a market for corporate control is investments. 
With investments, the ownership structure becomes more diffused, there is higher 
investor participation in the market and therefore, more regulation is required. For 
instance, the existence of agency cost problems are more frequent in companies which 
operate in countries that have a more dispersed ownership model and for this reason 
require corporate governance procedures to be put into place (Gogineni et al., 2013). 
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Consequently, the aforementioned regulation of companies and respective processes 
could slowly lead to an open corporate control market, in which more takeovers and 
takeover defenses will emerge. 
 
7. Conclusions, Proposals, Recommendations  
 
In conclusion, this paper presents an analysis of the interaction between takeover 
defenses and characteristics of the economic structure. Takeovers, takeover defenses 
and their regulatory framework are important factors of the economic activity that may 
further advance or hinder economic development.  
 
It could be suggested that takeover defenses are present in high contestable markets 
with dispersed ownership structures, whereas they are less present in premature, non-
contestable markets in which concentrated ownerships are a basic economic 
characteristic. Also, in mature markets, because of the institutional investors presence 
and the reliance on finance equity, there are more opportunities for corporate control. 
On the contrary, economies that operate in a non-contestable market do not tend to 
have an open market for corporate control. 
 
The comparative analysis indicated that in economies where takeover defenses occur 
regularly, there is, also, regulation regarding the natural consequence of the 
development of takeover defenses by the board of directors of the target company. In 
contrast, in case of economies that there is no occurrence of takeovers, the absence of 
a regulatory framework for the takeover defenses is less advanced. Though, in the 
latter-mentioned economies, regardless the weak presence of certain regulated 
frustrating defenses, there are possible lawful actions by the board of directors that 
could be considered as actions of takeover defenses.  
 
Moreover, special consideration in takeovers and the relevant defenses should be 
given in case of significant events in the environment that may trigger major 
restructuring both in economies and companies’ ownerships. For instance, the 2020 
pandemic and the 2021 departure of the UK from the European Union (Brexit) are 
critical events for the economic activity worldwide. Since the markets are 
experiencing volatile pressures, regulation of takeovers should be carefully designed 
to allow “functional economic sustainability”, which means healthy competition and 
restructure for the advancement of the society at large.   
 
Future research suggestions include the regulation of takeovers and takeover defenses 
in EU in the light of harmonization efforts. Given the significant differences in the 
structure and characteristics between the EU, and even more crucial Eurozone, 
countries harmonized procedures appear crucial not only for EU’s economic 
development but for its’ sustainability and survival as well.  
 
Further, the potential formulation of a common basic regulatory framework 
worldwide may promote companies’ advancement and offer a better economic 
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environment for development. An intense cooperation between market representatives 
and lawmakers is strongly recommended in order to consider the best regulatory 
framework that would address takeovers, takeover defenses and their consequences in 
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